As in philosophy in general, Critical Theory is not good with feelings. On the one hand, this is not surprising, because Critical Theory is essentially concerned with the problem of legitimizing critique, i.e. with the question of how critique can be justified, and this justification is based on reason as the epitome of justification. On the other hand, the situation is very surprising, because it is an essential part of the self-conception of Critical Theory to present an expanded concept of reason that is not rationalistically limited. My talk aims to address this astonishing emotional void in Critical Theory. Starting from its founding fathers, I will focus on more recent developments—all of which draw on Jürgen Habermas’s work—that intimate new approaches to feeling but ultimately fall short of their potential. My talk concludes by arguing that the expansion of reason requires a “translation” or “transformation” of feelings. What is needed is not a theory of separation, but a theory of integration, and this specific integration cannot succeed without aesthetics.