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Does Trust Have a History?

A lot of what goes wrong in the world today – in the economy, in politics, in personal relations – is attributed to a lack of trust. Our obsession with trust is not a recent phenomenon, though; it has been a preoccupation of modernity ever since the eighteenth century, when the upheaval of the French Revolution introduced trust into the emotional lexicon of continental Europe. As much as trust is supported by state institutions, it is also a personal investment that depends on shared expectations and desires. As such, it can easily be manipulated and instrumentalized by those in power. But it can also be used to empower citizens and limit state authority.

Russell Hardin

Government without Trust

The three leading theories of trust are applicable to individuals. We judge people to be trustworthy toward us in some specific context if we think they are committed to maintaining a trustworthy character; we think they have a strong moral commitment to fulfilling trusts that they have taken on in some sense; we think to have good reason to want to maintain good relations with us (or relevant others). None of these can be readily applied to trust in institutions of government. There is however a long-standing view that we should not trust government, as implied in many libertarian positions and as asserted explicitly in James Madison’s thesis of liberal distrust. Madison wished to weaken government, not enable it. We can suppose that an individual might have a rich enough relationship to be able to trust some agent or small agency of government, but not government per se. Surveys suggest that those who know enough to be able to judge much of the government trustworthy might be only about five percent. Claims that government needs citizen trust if it is to function at all are therefore prima facie false. The underlying political issues have changed in ways that reduce confidence in government. And in the USA, the two main political parties have altered their stances away from social libertarianism.

Russell Hardin is professor of politics at New York University and the author of many books, most recently How Do You Know? The Economics of Ordinary Knowledge (2009), Hume: Moral and Political Theorist (2006), Trust (2006), Indeterminacy and Society (2005), and Trust and Trustworthiness (2002). He is also the editor of Distrust (2004), volume 5 in the Russell Sage Foundation series on trust. Hardin is a fellow at the American Association for the Advancement of Science and at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Philip Kitcher

Trusting Experts

Especially in the United States, but to a lesser extent in other parts of the world, there is continuing resistance to scientific expertise. This surfaces in distrust of an exceptionally broad consensus about anthropogenic global warming, in distrust of claims about the safety of genetically modified organisms, and with respect to many other scientific topics. The source of the trouble lies in the difficulties of integrating deference to experts with apparently fundamental democratic principles. I shall try to show how prominent features of contemporary political life translate important democratic ideas into facile slogans – for
example, recommendations about “free and open” discussions – that undermine a valuable division of epistemic labor. On the basis of my diagnoses, I shall offer some tentative suggestions about how trust in experts might be restored.

**Philip Kitcher**, currently a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, is the John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He is the author of books on the philosophy of science, on the philosophy of mathematics, on the philosophy of biology, on science and social issues, and on ethics, as well as on Wagner’s *Ring* and Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*. A former President of the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), he is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was the first recipient of the Prometheus Prize, awarded by the American Philosophical Association for lifetime achievement in expanding the frontiers of philosophy and the sciences. His stay in Germany during the current academic year is partially supported by a Humboldt prize. His publications include *Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature* (1985), *The Advancement of Science* (1993), *Science, Truth, and Democracy* (2001), *In Mendel’s Mirror* (2003), and *Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design, and the Future of Faith* (2009). In German his works have appeared under the titles *Genetik und Ethik* and *Mit Darwin leben*.

**Guido Möllering**

*Trust and Deception*

My talk explores the conceptual relationship between trust and deception. I discuss five main topics: deceptive signals of trustworthiness, the suspension of uncertainty in trust, the moral implications of trusting and deceiving, the trustor’s self-deception, and the reversibility of trust. My conclusion is that trust and deception both enable and prevent one another and that this ambivalent relationship is due to the leaps and lapses of faith that characterize trust and distrust. Beyond implications for further research, the trust-deception ambivalence can help us make better sense of deception in private and public life against the background of trust relationships that enable, prevent, require, and prohibit deception – all at the same time.

**Guido Möllering** is associate professor of organization and management at Jacobs University Bremen. Before that he was senior research associate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. He has a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge and completed his habilitation at the Freie Universität Berlin. He is the author of *Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity* (2006) and has co-edited the *Handbook of Research Methods on Trust* (due out November 2011). In 2009 he received the Peregrinus Award of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and
Onora O’Neill

*Perverting Trust*

Many public, journalistic, and academic discussions of trust focus on empirical evidence of generic attitudes of trust and mistrust, yet say little about the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness to which such attitudes supposedly respond. From a practical point of view this is perverse: if we are to place and refuse trust intelligently we must do so on the basis of judgments of others’ trustworthiness, or lack of trustworthiness in specific matters, and generic attitudes will seldom be helpful. The task of judging whether others say what they mean and will do what they say in a given situation can be epistemically demanding, and often requires judgments of others’ competence, honesty and reliability in specific matters.

Onora O’Neill was Principal of Newnham from 1992 to 2006, and is professor emeritus at the Faculty of Philosophy in Cambridge. She has been a member of and chaired the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the Human Genetics Advisory Commission. She has worked on a number of reports on bio-medical issues, including recently the Kings Fund Inquiry into the Safety of Maternity Services. She was made a Life Peer in 1999, sits as a crossbencher, and served in the House of Lords. She writes on ethics and political philosophy, with particular interests in questions of international justice, in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and in bioethics. Her books include *Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Development and Justice* (1986), *Constructions of Reason: Exploration of Kant’s Practical Philosophy* (1989), *Towards Justice and Virtue* (1996), *Bounds of Justice* (2000), *Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics* (2002), *A Question of Trust* (the 2002 Reith Lectures) and *Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics* (jointly with Neil Manson, 2007).

Jan Philipp Reemtsma

*Trust and Mistrust*

The concept of trust covers a wide spectrum of subjects. It governs interpersonal relations – what they are, what they can be, how they emerge, what they consist of, and how they can be disturbed or broken. Trust also exists between people and institutions, as well as in people’s very ideas about the stability of their society. If one associates trust with the belief that social relations will
somehow persist come what may, then trust is about the interaction between individuals and groups with the environment they live in. To have trust in this sense is to have an idea of “what to do next.” Accordingly, mistrust is not the opposite of trust; it is a strategy of orientation in an environment that is regarded as more or less trustworthy. Even when you choose to mistrust, trust is given, because you can still act. Historically speaking, the relationship between trust and mistrust is constantly fluctuating, and these developments are one way of describing cultural change.


Ann Kathrin Scheerer

Trust as Benign Illusion

My talk addresses a psychoanalytic understanding – or, perhaps, the psychoanalytic understanding – of how we develop what German psychologists call Urvertrauen. Sometimes referred to in English as “basic trust,” Urvertrauen forms during our earliest childhood experiences and, once in place, becomes a life-long source of stability for the psyche. In describing this phenomenon I will discuss two patients under my care who were unable to establish a sense of basic trust in early childhood and the effects it has had on their personality and development.

Ann Kathrin Scheerer, a practicing psychoanalyst in Hamburg, speaks and writes frequently about childhood development. She is the director of Extrafamilial Care in Early Childhood and Its Effects on Children and Parents, a study group of the German Psychoanalytic Association, and is the chair of the elderly care facility of the Philipp F. Reemtsma Foundation. In 1993 she published Sieben Chinesinnen: Gespräche über Körper, Liebe, Sexualität.
Stefano Zamagni

Reciprocity as a Generator of Trust: Evidence from Team Players in Firms

I begin my talk with an explanation of the basic trust game, and use it to show why a market economy cannot properly function without a substantial amount of trust among its members. My talk then turns to the following question: what generates trust, and what can be done in order to increase trust relations among people within a community? The answer is contained in a word: reciprocity. First, I elucidate the idea of reciprocity, which is completely different from that of exchange of equivalents. Second, drawing from recent experimental evidence, I will show how and under which conditions reciprocity can generate trust. Finally, I indicate some applications of the reciprocity strategy for business. I will make explicit the link existing between trust and connective capital, which nowadays is considered the most relevant factor of success for firms in a post-Taylorist age.